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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
THE ZAMBIAN EXPERIENCE.
SlM BI V MUBAKO*
The subject of human rights never fails to excite the interest of lawyers 
and politicians. The topic is to the law what the theme of love is to literature 
and music. It is for that reason that most modern constitutions contain 
some statement concerning human rights. The Zambian Constitution 
adopted in 1964, like the Zimbabwean one of 1980, affirms human rights 
eloqv ently and in elaborate detail in a Chapter which comprises the nation’s 
Bill o '  Rights.
This article is about the application of the Zambian Bill of Rights 
to real life by the Courts. In a wider sense it is also a comparative study 
of similar types of constitutional devices. The article was originally written 
several years ago during my days as an academic lawyer. It has been 
updated a few times up until 1981 when publication was expected but then 
became unavoidably delayed. Therefore I do not lay any claim to be 
making an up to date statement of Zambian law or any other law that 
is referred to. However I do believe that most of what is stated is still 
valid though not exhaustive. Perhaps the article will prove more valuable 
to the reader with a more universal interest in fundamental rights and the 
way they have been conceived and interpreted in various jurisdictions over 
the last century.
It is also this latter dimension which explains why an article on the 
Zambian Constitution should appear in the Zimbabwean Law Review and 
under my name in 1984. It should be obvious that I am not submitting 
this article in my present political capacity as a Minster nor indeed in my 
previous reincarnation as Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. 
I do so purely out of a desire to share with those that have the time and 
inclination to read and reflect, the fruit of our research effort. I do so 
also on account of my abiding interest in the Zambian law and constitution, 
the area of study in which politicians must on pain of losing their jobs 
be parochial unless told to behave differently, scholars often have interests 
which range beyond national boundaries.
f The freedom charter of the Zambian people is enshrined in Part III 
p i  the Constitution. In eighteen long articles the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual are meticulously spelt out and closely qualified. I
I tThe introductory section summarises them as follows:
U
IL “ Whereas every person in Zambia is entitled to fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say the right, 
whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour,
t______________________________ ________________________________________________________
f  Minister o f Supply, Republic of Zimbabwe. Formerly Professor of Public Law, National 
^ "niversity of Lesotho.
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creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and for the public interest to each and all 
of the following
(a) life, liberty, security of person and the protection of the 
law;
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly 
and association; and
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other 
property and from deprivation of property without 
compensation;
the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the 
purpose of affording protection to those rights and freedoms 
subject to such limitations designed to ensure that the 
enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual 
does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the 
public interest” .1
The general purpose of the Chapter is to define a certain area of human 
activity which shall, within limits, be sacrosanct and immune from 
legislative and executive encroachment and to constitute the courts, the 
custodians and umpires over that freedom.
Historically the Zambian Bill of Rights is a descendant of a similar 
bill in the Northern Rhodesia Constitution of 1963 which was adopted 
almost intact into the Independence Constitution of 1964. Prior to that 
fundamental rights in this sense were as unknown to the territory as in 
the United Kingdom. In 1960 the Monckton Commission* 2 recommended 
the introduction of bills of rights into the constitutions of the federated 
territories of British Central Africa. Bills of rights were subsequently writ­
ten into the constitutions of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For Nor­
thern Rhodesia the fight for some guarantee of individual liberty was part 
and parcel of the struggle for independence. The United National In­
dependence Party (UNIP) came out with its own Declaration of Human 
Rights as early as October, 1960. The party wanted the constitution of 
Northern Rhodesia to contain “ fundamental safeguards guaranteeing the 
freedom of the individual and providing against abuse of power by the 
executive” . The Declaration comprised 14 items including practically every 
freedom in the present constitution. 3
The new clamour for and imperial approval of bills of rights in British 
Central Africa were not isolated events. The early 1960’s as a whole is 
a period when bills of rights came unexpectedly into vogue in English legal 
thinking. English legal theorists had for long stubbornly resisted the. 
influence of the French Revolution and American Constitution for theii 
home and colonial constitutions. Even the atrocities of the two Great Wars 
of the 20th century which influenced many nations to adopt constitutional
'• Art 13 Constitution of Zambia, Act No. 27, 1973
2- Cmnd 1148-501, 1960
3' A copy of the full declaration can be found in Mulford: The Northern Rhodesia General 
Election 1962. OUP, London, (1964), p. 191.
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guarantees over individual liberties, generally left English jurists unmoved 
and unimpressed. India might follow the principles of the Constitution 
of Eire, but neither was to be allowed to influence the constitutions of 
Britain’s dependencies, for both republicanism and philosophical 
manifestos in legal documents with which the U.S.A., France, Eire and 
India were associated, stank in the nostrils of His Majesty’s legal advisers. 
Even the international concern with individual liberty influenced by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the European 
Convention of Human Rights (1951) to which the United Kingdom was 
party had no immediate impact on English legal theory.
British and Commonwealth acceptance of Bills of Rights as domestic 
legal documents came suddenly after their adoption in the Nigerian and 
Sierra Leone constitution in 1959. From 1960 on most of Britain’s 
dependencies, including the territories comprising the Central African 
Federation, were issued with constitutions containing similar justiciable 
bills of rights and these were invariably retained at independence.
Writing in 1964, Professor de Smith, observed the process of change 
in British attitudes to bills of rights as follows:
“ We could be witnessing yet another manifestation of that 
familiar process in which the deplorable becomes recognised 
as the inevitable and is next applauded as desirable; or the 
unfolding of a wilderness of single instances; or the opening 
of a new chapter in the history of British political thought” .4
Today it is possible to register more firmly that a transformation had 
indeed occurred in British legal philosophy. Modem Anglo-Saxon attitudes 
look much more favourably upon a foreign country that accepts a bill 
of rights than one which does not; British liberal conscience will be the 
first to express disapproval when an African country discards its 
constitution or suspends its bills of rights. Indeed powerful voices have 
recently been raised in favour of bills of rights even for the home 
constitution.5
Thus in the 1960’s British jurisprudence came to accept the usefulness 
of bills of rights for foreign countries including former British colonies; 
since the seventies it has become less heretical to preach the virtues of 
judicially guaranteed fundamental rights for the United Kingdom,6 and 
the next decade may well witness the introduction of a bill of rights into 
the home constitution.
4' The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions: Stevens, London 1964 p. 163.
5' A.Lester: “ Fundamental Rights in the United Kingdom: the Law and the British 
Constitution” , University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol 125, No.2.1976, p. 337.
Leslie Scarman: English Law: The New Dimension, Stevens, 1974. Lord Hailsham said that a 
BUI of Rights in the U.K. was desirable in order to restrain “ socialist”  legislation, The Times 
(London) 16,19 May 1975.
*• A.Lester, op. cit.
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During the same period a lively debate on fundamental rights was 
in progress among the older members of the Commonwealth which like 
the United Kingdom had on the whole eschewed general guarantees of 
individual liberties. New Zealand introduced a bill of rights in August 1963; 
in some Australian states notably New South Wales and Queensland the 
adoption of comprehensive bills of rights became hot political issues. 
Perhaps the most important effort among the old Commonwealth 
countries was taken by the Diefenbaker Government in 1960 which enacted 
a bill of rights eo nomine, albeit in a qualified and unique form. The 
Canadian Bill of Rights enacted by the Dominion Parliament7 in 1960 is 
(1) a statutory not a constitutional measure; (2) it is explicitly limited to 
federal matters; (3) it is not legally enforceable; and (4) it may be abrogated 
by a legislative measure which expressly states that the Act of the 
Parliament of Canada “ shall operate not with standing the Canadian Bill 
of Rights” . These are substantial qualifications which leave the bill with 
but few teeth. It merely states that all statutes, past and future, shall be 
so construed or applied as not to “ abrogate, abridge, or infringe” the 
rights enumerated in the bill of rights. The actual list of rights enumerated 
comprises most of the rights commonly regarded as fundamental rights 
by most States in the world today. But its usefulness was not immediately 
apparent at the time of its enactment. An eminent constitutional authority 
stated that the bill is merely “ admonitory, enunciating a rule of conduct 
for Parliament and a rule of interpretation for the Courts” 8 which might 
be used to promote civil liberties. Its function appeared to lie somewhere 
between that of the Indian Directive Principles and that of the Zambian 
legal rules which are justiciable.9 However, in time even the Canadian BUI 
of Rights seems to have acquired greater legal significance than originally 
envisaged. It has been held to prevail over antecedent legislation 
discriminating against Red Indians.10 1Mr. Joseph Drybones, a Canadian 
Indian, was convicted for being “ unlawfully intoxicated off reserve 
contrary to section 94 (b) of the Indian Act” . Canadians of other races 
were free to get drunk outside reserves. The Supreme Court of Canada 
was prepared to entertain the argument that this law prescribed a burden 
on Indians from which other Canadians were exempt and thus contravened 
the “ equality before the law” clause section 1 (b) of the Canadian Bill 
of Rights and ruled that the law was inoperative. The general rule that 
emerged was that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between another 
statute and the bill of rights the latter must prevail." The Canadian Bill 
of Rights had clearly waxed stronger from its tender beginnings.
; 8 A 9 E/tz. 2, C. 44 (I960).
8 Bora Laski: The Canadian Bill o f  Rights, (1962) II  I.C.L.Q. p  519 at p  527. See also R  v 
Gonzales (1962) 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290; Robertson &. Rosetanni v R [1963] S.C.R. 651.
9 For a full discussion of the Canadian bill see de Smith, op cit. pp. 205-210.
10 R V Drybones. (1970] S.C.R. 282, For an interesting discussion of the implications of this 
case see W.S. Tarnopolsky: The Canadian Bill of Rights from Diefenbaker to Drybones, 
McGill Law Journal, Vol. 17, 1971, p 437.
11 The rule had been adumbrated in Mr Justice Cartwright’s dissenting judgement in Regina v 
Gonzales. (1962) 32 D.L.R. (2nd) at 662.
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Some Afro-Asian Objections
It must not be supposed that in the 1960’s all the new states of the 
Commonwealth were suddenly issued with bills of rights drafted at 
Westminster. Most did accept bills but there were some significant 
exceptions among the new African and Asian rulers, notably the 
Presidential regimes of Ghana, Tanganyika, Malawi and Pakistan. Military 
regimes which now dominate the African political scene have been less 
outspoken about their rejection of codes on fundamental rights than the 
presidents they replaced. However, in practice the military are no less im­
patient with justiciable bills of rights as they are with constitutional govern­
ment generally. The problem of human rights becomes submerged in the 
wider one of constitutionalism. For some explanation of the rejection of 
bills of rights by some of the new states it is necessary to turn to the 
presidential regimes mentioned above.
Ghana attained independent statehood in 1957 and for the following 
ten years its government policies and attitudes were moulded in the image 
of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumahism came to mean many things. 
African liberation, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, African personality, 
socialism; to many Ghanaians it also meant personal rule and preventive 
detention. Kwame Nkrumah took delight in wielding concentrated power 
and brooked no opposition, political or judicial. It was therefore axiomatic 
that justiciable bills of rights found no place in his scheme of things. His 
admiration of Nehru did not lead him to adopting an Indian style 
declaration of fundamental rights for Ghanaians in the independence 
constitution. Instead the Republican Constitution of 1960 omitted all 
mention of bills of rights. Ghanaians had to be content with a presidential 
undertaking to adhere to certain fundamental principles of conduct. A 
bold attempt to transform the presidential declaration into a justiciable 
“ Bill of Rights” was categorically shot down by the Supreme Court which 
stated
“ In our view the declaration merely represents the goals to 
which every President must pledge himself to attempt to 
achieve. It does not represent a legal requirement which can 
be enforced by the courts . . . The declarations; however, 
impose on every President a moral obligation, and provide a 
political yardstick by which the conduct of the Head of State 
can be measured by the electorate. The people’s remedy for 
any departure from the principles of the declaration is 
through the use of the ballot box, and not through the 
courts” .12
In the case of Ghana the people could derive little consolation from the 
court’s pronouncement given the reality of a one party state and Kwame 
Nkrumah’s personal control of the ruling party and elections thereunder.
12. Re Akolo  [1961] G.L.R. 523
What has been said of Ghana can with minor modifications be said of 
other presidential regimes as well.
Pakistan adopted a bill of rights after independence, modelled on that 
of India. However, these guarantees were soon jettisoned together with 
the constitution. The military rulers who took over power in rapid 
succession in the wake of a series of coup d ’etats had as little regard for 
fundamental human rights as they had for the constitutions they overthrew. 
The main objection against bills of rights stemmed from the fear of the 
rulers that justiciable guarantees of human rights would unduly limit 
executive action. General Ayub Khan had occasion to denounce justiciable 
bills of rights saying they gave unfair advantage to wealthy citizens and 
are liable to hold up the implementation of vital developmental 
programmes.13
The ruling party in Tanzania has consistently rejected the very concept 
of fundamental human rights with cynical disdain. Bills of rights had been 
excluded from both the independence and Republican Constitutions of 
Tanzania because they were regarded as the kind of luxury which the people 
could hardly afford to entertain.14Later the Tanzanian Commission for 
the establishment of a one party state also dismissed the idea of judicial 
review on the footing that such a power would increase the chances of 
conflict between the courts, the executive and the legislature. The 
Commission Report stated that “ decisions concerning the extent to which 
individual rights must give way to the wider considerations of social 
progress are not properly judicial decisions. They are political decisions 
best taken by political leaders responsible to the electorate” .15 A former 
Attorney-General16 of the Tanzanian Government recently attributed his 
country’s inflexible opposition to the concept of a court-enforced bill of 
rights to his government’s distrust of Britain’s bona fides in proposing 
to prescribe a bill of rights for independent Tanzania when she had ruled 
the territory without such a device and did not have one in her own 
constitution. There was suspicion in the early days that Britain was seeking 
to continue to control Tanzania policy through the judges who were of 
necessity going to be British in origin for some time after independence. 
Perhaps another explanation for the opposition at the time of independence 
was the tremendous influence exerted by Nkrumah’s Ghana on East 
African, particularly Tanganyikan, political thinking.
Malawi had an enforceable bill of rights up to 1964. The present 
republican constitution merely states that “ the Government and people 
of Malawi shall continue to recognise the sanctity of the personal liberty 
as enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and of adherence to the Law of Nations” 17 Some of these principles on 
which Government “shall be founded” are specifically spelt out e.g. that 
no person should be deprived of his property without the payment of fair
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3' The Constitution: The President Addresses the Nation (1962), pp. 8-9.
14' Proposals of the Tanganyika Government for a Republic, Govt. Pap. No. 1 1962, 6.
15' Commission Report p. 31.
16‘ Mark D. Bomani’s remarks during “ Seminar on Human Rights, their Protection and the Rule 
of Law in a One Party State” , International Commission of Jurists Dar es Salaam, Sept. 
22-29, 1976.
17' Constitution of Malawi, s 2
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compensation, that “ all persons regardless of colour, race or creed should 
enjoy equal rights and freedoms etc.”  The constitution goes on to state 
that no law or action done under a law shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of the declaration if the law is “ reasonably 
required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order or the 
national economy” . At one glance it is clear that this declaration of 
principles contains an extraordinary indulgence of loose drafting which 
obscurs its meaning and legal import. It is. at once mandatory and 
admonitory in its terms and the last provision added by an amendment 
of 1968, seems to invite judicial review of legislation as well as executive 
action, which the declaration, read as a whole, clearly negates. The 
document certainly does not contain justiciable rights. And even if it were 
a bill of rights there would be hardly anything to enforce since the exception 
clause is so wide. What action could fail to pass under defence, safety, 
order or national economy?
General Arguments against Bills of Rights
1. Today most states in the world accept, or do not oppose, the 
codification of individual rights in some document which will act as a 
standard and guide for the government and protection of the citizen. These 
documents are sometimes called “ directive principles of state policy” , 
“ principles of law making” , or “ normative assertions” . Such documents 
lay down general norms but are not enforceable legal rules. The best 
example of such documents on the level of international relations is 
afforded by the generalities in the provisions of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which represent no more than a “ common standard 
of achievement” . For that reason the vast majority of U.N. members voted 
for or adhered to it.18 Rather fewer states have gone further to accept 
international conventions constituting rules of strict law which confer rights 
on individual citizens and which they can enforce against the state. 
Examples of such legally binding documents at international law are the 
European Convention of Human Rights and the U.N. Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Convenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights which were signed in 1966 by less than a third of the U.N. members 
(38 and 39 respectively) and took ten years to attract enough ratifications 
for the Covenants to enter into force.19
,S' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a resolution passed by the U.N. General 
Assembly on December 10, 1948 by forty eight votes to nil and eight absetentations (Three 
USSR votes, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia and South Africa). The Declaration and 
other U.N. actions on human rights are based on the U.N. Charter especially Arts. 55 and 56 
which impose on the legal obligations on members to promote “ Universal respect for and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.’* The Declaration itself is not a 
legally binding agreement but has had a considerable impact as well as on the bills of right of 
a number of states.
19, Up to now the two Covenants have 44 and 46 contracting parties respectively including the 
U.K. and the U.S.S.R.
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However the acceptance by states of international instruments on 
human rights does not always correspond with the states’ willingness to 
adopt or to retain justiciable bills of rights in their domestic law. The 
outstanding example, is of course, the United Kingdom where the 
government’s readiness to embrace international obligations has been 
matched by continued resistance to bills of rights at home. True the old 
anti-bill-of-rights xenophobia has lost some of its force even in England, 
but a degree of cynicism persists about the efficacy of such documents. 
In Africa and other developing countries the doubts and silent reservations 
are promoted by the frequency with which constitutions have been 
overthrown or constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights suspended. 
It is therefore still relevant to review some of the more general conceptual 
arguments against bills of rights.
It is easy enough to understand attitudes and tastes of this kind but 
it is not so easy to argue rationally against them. The major fallacy of 
the English traditional attitude which some English lawyers now see is one 
of muddled overgeneralisation. Englishmen may have bwn well governed 
without bills of rights but not necessarily because of that fact; some 
countries with bills of rights may have been misgoverned but it hardly 
makes sense to attribute the misgovernment to te presence ot documents 
guaranteeing human rights.
A second fallacy of the Anglo-Saxon utilitarians is the attempt to draw 
a dichotomous distinction between constitutional and statutory provisions 
from the point of view of their efficacy. Both are but categories of laws 
and all depend for their usefulness on the existence of a political will to 
enforce them. Constitutional and statutory provisions are not mutually 
exclusive as Dr. Wheare suggests. In fact the ideal constitution would 
seem to be one which declares and guarantees as many basic national 
issues, including human rights, as the people desire and which is serviced 
by a legal system which enforces those rights. The advocates of bills of 
rights are not asking for empty declarations, on the contrary, they want 
nations to adopt constitutional bills of rights as intergral parts of their 
legal systems.
1. The traditional hostility to legal documents on human rights can 
be explained on several grounds. Historically it was based on an over­
reaction to the ideas of the French Revolution. Jeremy Bentham may have 
been right in castigating a badly drafted French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man which did nothing to alleviate the excesses of the Jacobin reign 
of terror. He was wrong in lifting his strictures to the level of a universal 
condemnation of all fundamental rights as “ rhetorical nonsense - nonsense 
upon stilts” .20 Bentham’s followers, comprising the vast majority of 
English constitutional lawyers after him, developed his criticisms into a 
general distate for philosophical manifestos in legal documents - an ec­
centric constitutional tradition which tallied rather conveniently with their 
domestic political and legal experience. In England the only check on the
20. "Anarchical Fallacies", in Works (ed Bowring) Vol.2 pp. 497, 501.
power of Parliament to pass legislation derogating against the most basic 
liberties of the individual is a political one - the famed temper of the British 
people as expressed in their Parliament. This temper has worked so well 
over the years that generations of eminent apologists had no hesitation 
in extolling this political legal arrangement as the best possible one for 
all nations. Englishmen, said Sir Ivor Jennings, “ merely have liberty ac­
cording to law . . . (but) do the job better than any country which has 
a Bill of Rights or a Declaration of the Rights of Man” / 1 Dicey had 
stated earlier that the Habeas Corpus Acts “ are for practical purposes, 
worth a hundred articles guaranteeing individual liberty” .2 2 Dr. Wheare 
only grudgingly conceded that a bill of rights might have a place in a con­
stitution but, said he, “ the ideal constitution then would contain few or 
no declarations of rights, though the ideal system of law would define 
and guarantee many rights” .23 More recently Professor Lloyd was really 
reciting the familiar English credo when he said that “ from the point of 
view of legal technique we already possess a better method tried and tested 
over generations, for establishing, delimiting, and enforcing human rights, 
than the proposed substitute of a pre-determined Bill of Rights under 
judicial control.” 238
There is a third fallacy in the arguments of the English utilitarian 
writers. They say declarations failed in France but statutory and common 
law remedies succeeded in England; ergo constitutional declarations are 
bad and statutory and common law remedies are good. Even if the premiss 
was true, which it is not, the conclusion is obviously a non sequitur. This 
is immediately apparent if we reverse the equation. A France armed with 
the common law and statutes given the history and social conditions 
engendered by the ancien regime, would have fared no better under the 
Jacobin dictatorship. True the Declaration of the Rights of Man did not 
and could not save Marie Antoinette’s neck from the guillotine; but then 
it cannot be seriously suggested that the Habeas Corpus Acts or any other 
English legal remedy could have altered her fate any more than they had 
saved the neck of Charles I or the throne of James II of England. We 
have, numerous recent cases, from colonial Kenya and Rhodesia to 
independent Nigeria and Uganda, of atrocities and inhumanities 
perpetrated in spite of the existence of the habeas corpus remedy or 
constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights. The lesson of history 
seems to be that occasionally there are some volcanic eruptions from the 
belly of society which appear to defy any manner of legal ordering. The 
law, whether contained in bills of rights or in individual statutory 
provisions or the judge’s rules, is never of itself sufficient to prevent social 
and political upheavals. It is disingenuous, to say the least, to attribute 
other people’s troubles to the presence of bills of rights or one’s own social 
stability to their absence. Moreover, to base one’s whole constitutional 
theory on the experience of a single nation, one’s own, and to ignore the 
accumulated wisdom of the rest of mankind smacks of the kind of legal 
nationalism which does little to develop^ a universal constitutional 
jurisprudence.
2I' The Approach to Self-Government, (1936) p. 20
22' The Law and the Constitution, 10 ed (1960) p. 199
23' Modern Constitutions, O.U.P. London 1966. p. 49
23a- “ Do We Need a  Bill of Rignts?”  39 Mod. Law Review. 1976. d. 125.
Z. L. Rev. Vol. 1 & 2 1983-84 105
106
Some modern English jurists have begun to question the supposed 
superior virtues of the British way of protecting civil liberties as not 
necessarily the best for all times even for the United Kingdom, The legal 
foundations of English civil liberties were designed for a nineteenth century 
type of British society whose insularity, affluence and stability were 
buttressed by an economy built on the resources of a vast empire and the 
industrial revolution at home, a society held together by a powerful army 
and administered'by a small band of like-minded civil servants drawn from 
the same social and educational background as the politicians and the 
judges; a society which preached the philosophy of laissez-faire and social 
Darwinism disapproving of state intervention on behalf of the 
underprivileged but which insisted on state protection of property and 
contract, a society which had not yet experienced the full weight of 
unionised working class and mass political parties; a society in which civil 
rights especially for women and workers were regarded more as political 
privileges which might be conceded if they were prepared to go out into 
the streets and demonstrate for them, than legal rights to be claimed in 
a court of law; a society which was moreover conscious that worse 
conditions for the underprivileged prevailed in most other European 
countries.
In the second half of the twentieth century these conditions have been 
transformed, in particular there is a far greater popular awareness of civil 
rights and a demand for their protection. The old machinery of protection 
may no longer be the best for the job today. It has been suggested that 
a bill of rights with properly enforced guarantees against religious 
discrimination might have averted the recent tribulations in Northern 
Ireland, and that an American type of bill of rights which has a reasonably 
effective machinery of judicial enforcement would improve the English 
law relating to police power of interrogation, search and seizure, obscene 
publications, and passports.24 25
The more beneficial course of action would seem to be for the 
Westminister Parliament to enact for the United Kingdom the European 
Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which 
is already enforceable in the United Kingdom as in fourteen other 
European states. The European Convention and its supplementary 
Protocols comprise some twenty articles containing a list of well defined 
rights which the parties to the Convention undertook to secure for every 
person within their jurisdiction. Since 1966 individual petitioners have been 
able to invoke Convention procedures alleging violation of their rights 
by the United Kingdom which also accepts the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the European Court. The European Commission upheld petitions by 
British citizens of Asian origin23 on the basis that the immigration 
procedures imposed on them by the British Government violated the right 
of security of the person and respect of family life (Art. 5), and constituted 
degrading treatment (Art.3) and discrimination on grounds of race (Art. 
14). Similarly certain police methods of interrogation in Northern Ireland 
and the use of the birch in the Isle of Man have been declared to be
Mubako, Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review
24• S.A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 3rrt £d. p 440.
25 ■ The Times (London) May 29, 1974.
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a violation of human rights. In these cases there was probably no remedy 
under municipal law. It is apparent that the United Kingdom had accepted 
for its nationals a sophisticated set of rules for the protection of human 
rights which is enforceable in Europe; enacting these rules in a domestic 
statute would enable United Kingdom citizens to enforce their rights in 
English courts. The advantages would be to remove any doubt or conflict 
about the applicability of the Convention rights in United Kingdom law 
and reduce the chances of United Kingdom practices which appear 
perfectly legal at home being pronounced illegal in Strasbourg. It is 
unimportant that such a bill should be formally entrenched; the European 
Communities Act 1972 can in theory be amended or repealed like any other 
act but cannot in fact be repealed without breaching the Treaty of Rome. 
But like the European Communities Act a statute enacting the European 
Convention into a United Kingodom Bill of Rights would have to be given 
testing powers against other laws either as strong as the United States Bill 
of Rights or in an attenuated form like the Canadian Bill of Rights. The 
European Convention is already acting as a negative check on United 
Kingdom legislation and executive practice in much the same way as the 
Canadian Bill does on Federal legislation.26 In reality the application of 
the Convention in the United Kingdom has taken much of the sting from 
the virulence of the traditionalists’ argument against bills of rights.
2. Secondly, the English had a belief that rights and freedoms of man 
cannot usefully be defined, let alone guaranteed. Sir Isiah Berlin in an 
Inaugural Lecture at Oxford, on October 31, 1958, stated:
“ Almost every moralist in human history has praised 
freedom. Like happiness and goodness, like nature and 
reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that there is 
little interpretation that it seems to be able to resist’’.27
Professor Wheare adduced a further difficulty in the way of definition, 
that liberty means different things to different people, and to the same 
people, and to the same people at different times. He further argued 
pragmatically, in line with most English jurists, that no constitution can 
concede absolute rights, and that rights must o f necessity be qualified 
whether or not you have a hill of rights. He expressed scepticism as to 
whether a bill made any worthwhile difference. He said no realistic attempt 
to define the rights of a citizen can exclude qualifications, and he asked, 
what of substance remained when these were given full effect. He cited 
Article 43 of the first Constitution of Eire as a classical example of giving 
a right with one hand and taking it away with the other. It began:
“  ‘The State acknowledges that man, in virtue o f his rational 
being, has the natural right, antecedent to positive law, to the 
private ownership of external goods’. It continued with a 
clause calculated to lift up the heart of the most old-
26' See ante
27, Two Concepts o f  Liberty, Oxford (1958), p 6.
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fashioned capitalist: ‘The State accordingly guarantees to pass 
no law attempting to abolish the rights of private ownership 
or the general right to transfer, bequeath and inherit 
property’. But the next two sentences are likely to disappoint: 
‘The State recognises, however, that the exercise of the rights 
mentioned in the foregoing provisions o f this Article ought, 
in civil society, to be regulated by the principles of social 
justice. The State, accordingly, may as occasion requires 
delimit by law the exercise of the said rights with a view to 
reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the common 
good’. The Constitution of Yugoslavia goes hardly further 
than this” .28
The difficulties of devising bills of rights may have been overstated 
by Professor Wheare. It is true that a constitutional guarantee which simply 
said “ every citizen shall have freedom of movement”  would raise 
justifiable suspicion. Equally an article which guaranteed that “ no person 
shall be deprived of his personal liberty except in accordance with the law” 
might be said to provide an illusory protection. However, these are pitfalls, 
which most modem draftsmen can avoid. Indeed the articles o f the 
neo-Nigerian Bills of Rights such as that of the Republic of Zambia do 
leave a measure of protection for the individual. There is no need to draft 
bills in the form of Article 43 of the Eire Constitution. Moreover there 
are bills of rights e.g. that of the United States Constitution which are 
revered by their citizens as providing protection of substance. Scholars 
should not pursue labyrinths of logic while ignoring existing reality.
Nevertheless the manner in which many governments particularly in 
Africa have in practice taken advantage of the exception clauses would 
tend to support Professor Wheare’s scepticism. When one examines the 
manner in which detention laws have in fact been applied in Ghana, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya, one is at a loss to pick which countries have 
bills and which have not.
3. Thirdly it is sometimes said that a bill of rights enforceable by the 
courts is a reactionary and undemocratic device which makes the courts 
the final arbiters of legality and policy instead of the elected representatives 
of the people. In England where the doctrine of the sovereignty of 
Parliament was canonised by Dicey and other writers such an argument 
has been accepted without further question; it has also appealed to other 
people of a liberal democratic persuasion. Judges are appointed and not 
elected, and by their training and tradition they tend to breed a conservative 
frame of mind. Why then, the argument goes, must they be given the power 
to review acts of parliament or of the executive? In this way judicial reviews 
and bills of rights are assailable as offending both against the sovereignty 
of parliament and the sovereignty of the people.
28 K.C. Wheare, Modem Constitutions, OUP London (1966) pp 40-44.
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The answer to this objection is that the testing right given to the courts 
is the most practical and fairest way of enforcing bills of rights. Parliament 
itself is ill equipped to provide remedies to an individual whose rights have 
been infringed. A separate agency could of course be endowed with the 
task of reviewing legislative and executive action against a bill of rights 
instead of the courts. But if the new institution is to apply strict procedures 
to ensure justice and impartiality we would simply end up with another 
court even if a reformed one. In any case the process could still be objected 
to as questioning parliamentary and popular sovereignty. The critics 
therefore tend to demand nothing less than the removal of the whole 
concept o f the enforceability o f human rights. But what use are rights 
which a citizen cannot enforce?
The argument that judicial or any other review of laws passed by 
legislature is thwarting the will o f the people is itself incorrect. If a 
constitution includes the power of judicial review it expresses the supreme 
will of the people acting solemnly in the people’s sovereign constituent 
capacity. In adopting the constitutions the people would place limitations 
on their parliaments as elected from time to time to legislate according 
to the constitution and by the same act they empower the courts to review 
any disputed legislation. Seen in this light judicial review is but a method 
of fulfilling the will of the people which, where there is a bill of rights, 
also protects their rights.
4. Another argument, often advanced by Marxists and other 
opponents of liberal democracy, is that judicial review limits executive 
action and hampers economic development which is perceived as the most 
needed commodity in new nations. It is said - rather crudely-that a hungry 
man requires food not a bill of rights, and that freedom of speech is no 
consolation to a man without a job. It is argued further that bills of rights 
are not only useless but that they may do positive harm. They permit one 
rich person to hold up government measures designed to wipe out hunger 
and unemployment.
In reality there is no conflict between rapid development and 
justiciable fundamental rights. The assumption of those who defend 
constitutional guarantees of human rights is that the individual member 
of society should not be sacrificed on the altar of economic development. 
Indeed it can be argued that greater and better development can be acheived 
only if the people collectively and individually are well treated.
5. One jurisprudentai objection against bills of rights says that they 
introduce uncertainties in the law. The main argument here is that where 
the courts are endowed with the guardianship of the constitution then no 
law passed by the legislature is certain to be valid until it is challenged 
in a private litigation and the law is upheld by the highest court in the 
state. Enactments which can be nullified by a private litigant years after 
they have been on the statute book and probably enforced on many other 
citizens who were not disposed to bring litigation must surely throw the 
law into an abyss of uncertainty and confusion. Moreover, decisions of
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lower courts upholding legislation can be appealed against and can be 
overturned, even the highest court itself can go back on its own previous 
decisions, rendering the state of uncertainty truly unending.
These are without doubt weighty objections to which there are no 
easy answers. The element of uncertainty is inherent in any system of 
judicial review. It is however, to be remembered that the argument is not 
limited to judicial review where there is a bill of rights but to every case 
of adjudication. In any case the suggested alternatives are either to have 
no bills of rights at all or to have bills which are not enforceable. This 
is hardly acceptable if one otherwise recognises bills of rights as valuable 
bulwarks against tyranny and despotism. To sacrifice the protection of 
the fundamental rights of the individual in the pursuit of legal certainty 
is to throw away substance and opt for the shadow, for “ certainty is a 
matter of degree and absolute certainty in law is an illusion” .29 
Uncertainty attributed to bills of rights can be minimised by empowering 
a tribunal or the courts to give an advisory opinion on any Bill before 
it is passed, as in the Zambian Constitution30 or immediately after the 
enactment of legislation. The latter method was suggested but rejected 
in Zambia.31
6. Yet another objection is that bills of rights are a privilege for the 
wealthy citizens who can afford the cost of litigation and are a goldmine 
for lawyers. This is really an objection to the whole judicial process not 
just in relation to fundamental rights. The remedy is to simplify the process 
of litigation and to provide adequate legal aid for poor people seeking 
to enforce their rights.
7. It is sometimes argued that bills of rights are useless for in time 
of crises such as war or national emergency they are apt to be suspended 
or abrogated. Bills of rights will not therefore protect civil liberties at the 
very occasions when those liberties are most likely to be invaded. Related 
to this point is the argument that bills of rights, however well entrenched, 
are in the last resort not immune from legislative encroachment. They can 
be qualified and emptied of any meaningful content; they can be suspended 
or abolished as the legislature feels fit. They only appear to work when 
the government has no need to encroach on the rights of the individual. 
In short, bills of rights add nothing to protect the individual against the 
government.
This objection goes to the root of the question whether bills of rights 
have any value. To this we shall revert in subsequent pages.
For the moment it must suffice to say that it is true bills of rights like 
any other parts of the constitution are not immune from legislative 
amendment or suspension particularly in crisis situation. Bills of rights
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are not meant to be an impregnable silo from which to confront the 
legislature and government. Their guarantees are necessarily qualified and 
may be overriden in the interests of security, for instance, in war. The 
protection bills of rights may provide in times of peace is still valuable. 
Even if the protection is suspended in a crisis it is better this is done 
consciously after the public have been informed than that this should 
happen unnoticed and as matter of habit.
8. Lastly it is sometimes said that judicial review of fundamental rights 
leads to confrontations on matters of policy between the government and 
the courts, and that since the courts are likely to emerge the losers in what 
is in reality a tussle for power, the judiciary would eventually be discredited.
To this argument we can only respond that if the government and 
the courts understand the function of bills of rights and their own respective 
roles, there need be no confrontations; if there are, the loser in any 
particular case need not be discredited. No serious confrontations have 
occured in Zambia, for example, although the country had operated a 
bill of rights since independence. Among the older states with bills of rights 
the United States had had some confrontations but the courts there have 
not been discredited.
The Value of Bills of Rights
When attempting to plead the case for Bills of Rights it is necessary, 
though it is by no means an easy task, to distinguish substance from form. 
Some of the opposing arguments we have reviewed show that those wno 
disparage Bill of Rights most vociferously do not always specify whether 
it is the content of civil liberties they oppose or the form of enactment, 
or merely the drafting techniques thereof. The Marxist opponents fall into 
the first category: they prefer to protect economic and social rights such 
as the right to just conditions of work, trade unions, social security, 
education and not what they regard as bourgeois freedoms, such as 
freedom of conscience, speech, association and of owning property. The 
English utilitarians on the other hand were not opposing the legal 
protection of any of these items of human rights, they only preferred to 
see that protection not in one neat constitutional document, but in the 
ordinary law of the land and the common decency of parliamentarians. 
Yet another group of critics oppose either loosely worded guarantees which 
in fact give no protection at all or those so narrowly framed as to prevent 
desirable legislative initiatives. The arguments we shall adduce here are 
not intended to convert those who object to human rights on ideological 
grounds. Belief cannot be altered by an appeal to reason. If one’s concept 
of political society is Hobbesian or Hegelian, then man has no rights 
antecedent to the state, and any talk of fundamental rights protected 
against violation by the state is a contradiction in terms.
The best known modern examples of states in which a person was 
regarded as no more than a cog in the state machine are of course Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy. But more recent examples of state disregard
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of human rights abound in the practice if not the theory o f many 
governments. The only difference is that today few governments will admit 
that they deny their citizens the right to life, fair trial, freedom from 
arbitrary arrest freedom of speech, association and most of the freedoms 
commonly found in Bills of Rights, even if in practice they do not protect 
these. The idea of human rights has permeated the international climate 
and taken hold of the aspirations of people throughout the world to the 
extent that it is no longer safe for rulers to openly reject the content of 
human rights even if they may reject Bills of Rights as a method of 
protecting those rights.
The first advantage of a Bill of Rights is that it is a basic legal 
document which defines and guarantees certain items of civil liberties which 
a particular society believes should be protected from encroachment by 
the state. It lays down minimum standards of protection for every person 
within the jurisdiction o f a state. On the part of the state the adoption 
of a Bill of Rights implies an acceptance of the idea of limited government 
and a rejection of absolute discretion and a recognition that all persons 
are to be treated equally and with respect not only as a matter of good 
statesmanship but as a matter of legal obligation. If one believes that state 
power ought to be controlled and that absolute power corrupts, it is not 
difficult to see that an effective Bill of Rights can be a very important 
bulwark against dictatorship.
A  Bill o f Rights is primarily a political document, a solemn covenant 
between the government and its people comparable to the Magna Carta 
1215 and the English Bill o f Rights 1689; it is a simple acceptance of the 
concept o f limited government and the foundation of liberty and 
democracy. While it is possible to have a democracy without a  Bill of 
Rights, the existence o f an effective Bill is the surest indication of the 
absence of tyranny. No one claims that a Bill of Rights by itself can prevent 
the emergence of tyranny; all that can be said is that the work of a  dictator 
is made much more difficult. As the report ot the Minorities Commission 
on Nigeria put it,
“ a  government determined to abandon democratic courses 
will find ways o f violating them. But they (Bills of Rights) 
are of a  great value in preventing a steady deterioration in 
standards o f freedom and the unobtrusive encroachment o f a 
government on individuals.” ”
By definition, law cannot guarantee against illegality, a Bill of Right is 
unlikely to stop a determined dictator any more than a  determined burglar 
will be stopped by the criminal law, but in both cases the citizen is protected 
by the knowledge that the dictator and the burglar are acting illegally and, 
if caught, will be punished.
Secondly, a  Bill of Rights may have a great educative value both on 
the citizens and on the state. It becomes a common charter, in 
understanding about people's rights. There can be no doubt that people
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in countries with bills of rights tend to be more consious of their rights 
than those who have to rely on the common law or individual statutes. 
If we compare the United Kingdom position with the United States of 
America we shall find that in the latter civil liberties are a much more 
lively subject, not only among lawyers but in the education system, in 
employment, housing, the army, and in pretty well every aspect of life. 
The high degree of consciousness of human rights among Americans is 
very largely attributable to the presence of a fairly effective Bill of Rights. 
In a young state emerging from decades of colonial suppression the 
majority of the people will have acquired the habit of submissiveness to 
government officials which may continue after independence is won by 
the educated elites. A Bill of Rights which is taught in schools and enforced 
by the courts may be one way of restoring people’s pride in themselves 
and creating a vigorous state of free people. The more people know and 
value their rights, the more difficult it will be for a tyrant to abolish them.
Education is a two way process. A Bill of Rights can educate the 
government as well as the administrators. It sets a standard to guide the 
legislature, draftsmen, and the individual civil servant who deals with the 
public. In time the whole state machinery gets into the habit of respecting 
the people they administer and in that way the people’s rights become more 
securely guaranteed.
Thirdly, the adoption of a Bill of Rights may in fact be good politics. 
A Bill of Rights tends to allay the fears of minority groups as well as those 
generally regarded as being at the receiving end of government. In spite 
of all the cynicism often voiced about Bills of Rights, it is amazing how 
they do in fact inspire confidence in politically disadvantaged groups. Many 
of the Commonwealth Bills of Rights have their origin in the desire to 
allay somebody’s fears. In most cases the departing colonial power would 
wish its citizens remaining in the new state to feel that they will not be 
arbitrarily harassed or dispossessed by the incoming regime. In Zambia 
the United Kingdom wished to reassure the mining companies and other 
foreign investors that they would not arbitrarily be dispossessed. The 
Zambian government gave them that reassurance partly by adopting a 
constitution containing an elaborate Bill of Rights which also helped to 
allay the fears of Zambia’s opposition groups. Looking back it cannot 
be said that Zambia has lost anything by giving that assurance. If anything, 
Zambians have probably gained. Desirable measures have been 
implemented without provoking unnecessary disaffection. For example, 
in 1964 the government acquired mineral royalties and in 1969 nationalised 
the mining industry without provoking the kind of hostility by the mining 
companies as could have wrecked the industry. In Zimbabwe, the former 
British Colony of Southern Rhodesia, the inclusion of a Bill of Rights 
was regarded as an important protection for the rights of the white minority 
which helped to induce them to accept the independence constitution under 
a black government.34
The other elements of protection of minority rights were separate representation for whites in 
Parliament and virtual unamendability of certain areas of the constitution for ten or seven 
years.
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Fourthly, justiciable bills of rights can provide an effective shield with 
which a citizen can defend himself against excessive official action. Not 
only do bills have a preventive potential, but, when a breach does occur, 
they have a remedial function as well. Bills often provide a cause o f action 
where none may exist under the common law or individual statutes. They 
are institution for ventilating grievances as well as for redressing rights 
infringed and fortunes ruined by official interference. The number of cases 
in which people who had no cause of action under British law but who 
succeeded in obtaining a remedy on the basis of the European Convention 
o f Human Rights33 is a telling illustration of the deficiencies o f the 
common law and the possible value of a bill of rights. Even where a bill 
is heavily qualified, there usually remains an area of protection which may 
make the bill well worth having.
Fifthly, the proliferation of international conventions on the subject 
of human rights indicates the general concern of mankind about 
safeguarding people’s liberties as well as a belief that bills of rights are 
important legal devices for achieving that purpose.
Moreover, most states have undertaken international obligation to respect 
human rights; the best way of implementing those pledges is to enact 
similar provisions in their domestic law in the same way as the provisions 
of the Geneva Convention on Diplomatic Relations are always enacted 
in domestic legislation. The great advantage of enacting a bill of rights 
is that it makes a conflict between a states international obligations and 
its home laws, such as we have seen in Britain, less likely. In relation to 
the United Kingdom, Sir Leslie Scarman strongly advocated the adoption 
of a bill of rights which he said was “ desirable — perhaps inevitable if 
the United Kingdom is fully to honour its international obligations and 
if its law is to meet the demands of a rising public opinion.” 3* This 
remark is even more relevant to developing countries which may have no 
strong tradition for respecting human rights.
The Zambian BUI of Rights
In Zambia the Bill o f Rights, apart from the original articles. 18,23 
and 25 and subject to observations made below, has been on the whole 
respected. The body of constitutional cases decided so far is small and 
successful invocations o f the Bill against the State few. But all of them 
are leading cases regarded as such by the courts, government and people.
There can be no doubt that the Zambian Bill of Rights has already 
made a tremendous impact on the people which the government cannot 
easily ignore. The whole exercise of introducing a one party system in 
Zambia and the reaction of the people has borne this contention out. The 
new political order does mean a curtailment of some of the freedoms 
hitherto enjoyed under the Bill of Rights which the government has effected 356
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through Parliament’s powers of amending the Constitution. Nevertheless, 
the President being sensitive to people’s acquired tastes for individual 
liberties, set up a National Commission to consider the constitutional 
changes necessary for the implementation of the one party system, adding 
that “ the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual shall be 
protected as now provided under Chapter III of the Consitution of the 
Republic of Zambia,” 37 The Commission found this directive rather 
contradictory since in a one party state, there could be no right to form 
other political associations or express opinions about them. Apart from 
those necessary changes, the Commission recommended and the 
government accepted that other freedoms remain unaltered. The 
Commission reported that many petitioners made strong recommendations 
in favour of the right of personal liberty and the right to freedom as 
enshrined in the Constitution. Furthermore, a battle to halt the 
introduction of the one party system was fought and lost in the courts.38
When a similar exercise took place in Tanganyika — a country which 
had never had a bill of rights-there was no comparable clamour for the 
fundamental freedoms of the individuals. The Zambian Bill has endeared 
itself to a people that is to a large extent legally unsophisticated. We shall 
discuss below the Zambian Bill in closer detail, together with the relevant 
cases that have so far come before the courts.
The Zambian Bill of Rights, like others emanating from the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, consists of two parts — a declaratory 
section and a detailed list of individual guarantees with their qualifications. 
The courts have construed each guarantee as being re-inforced by the 
preamble article 13.
Secondly, the guarantees protect individual rather than community 
rights. The experiments with guarantees of minority rights for groups of 
people during the protectorate era, included devices like the qualified 
franchise, the Federal African Affairs Board, and reserved seats for racial 
groups, were all abandoned at independence. The philosophy of African 
Nationalism was that all these devices were unnecessary. Give the individual 
a vote and protect his rights, it was argued, and you have given the minority 
groups the best possible protection. The United National Independence 
Party Declaration of Fundamental Human Rights of October 1960 stated:
“ These fundamental laws will not alone safeguard the 
members of the minority groups but all the people of the 
country. They are not a concession to any one group or a 
community but rather an expression of UNIP’s belief in the 
dignity and freedom of the individual and in the principles of 
justice and charity to all.”
37' Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One Party Participatory 
Democracy in Zambia, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1972, p. 9.
38 NkumbulO v. Attorney-General, [1972] S J Z 40
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Thirdly, the Bill of Rights protects the rights of “ every person in 
Zambia.”  It does not discriminate as to race, colour, political view or 
religion. It is not limited to citizens as in some articles o f the Indian 
Bill.35
Fourthly, as suggested in Art 13, the rights in the Bill may be classified 
as (1) personal, (2) political (3) and possessory. They may also be grouped 
as positive and negative rights. However, no analytical benefit can be 
derived from those descriptions and no further reference to these 
classifications need be made.
The principles o f derogation are fairly common to all rights. All rights 
and freedoms are guaranteed subject to the respect for the rights o f others 
and for the public interest, and subject to any specific limitations in the 
individual provision. When the Republic is at war or is under a declaration 
of emergency any measures may be taken to deal with the situation even 
if they otherwise abrogate the fundamental rights provisions provided they 
are reasonably justifiable for the purpose. Indeed, any permitted 
derogation must be “ reasonably required” 39 40 for the purpose. Secondly, 
a derogation must not be impugned as “ not reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society” . This vague phrase has seen much judicial 
interpretation. It includes illusive factors which tempt judges to impose 
an interpretation based on their own political philosophy and social scale 
of values. In the Kachasu case,41 “ democratic society”  was equated with 
“ the democratic society which exists here in Zambia.”  That definition 
cannot be the one intended by the framers of the constitution. It is not 
difficult to picture a situation where Zambia is ruled by a military junta 
without elections and the rulers claiming that they are running a 
democracy. The criterion cannot be any existing political set up but must 
be objective. Kachasu was openly abandoned on this point in Patel v. A.G. 
where Mr. Justice Magnus stated that in spite of some distinction between 
standards of democracy in developed and developing societies “ there are 
certain minima which must be found in any society, developed or 
otherwise, below which it cannot go and still be entitled to be considered 
as a democratic society.” 42
THE INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS
THE R IG H T TO LIFE
“ No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in 
execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal
39' Constitution of India Aits. 15, 16, 19, 29, 30. Gopalan v. Slate o f Madrasfl950J S C I  174
40' Ait 26 “Public interest” indudes defence, public safety, public order, public morality or 
public health.
4I' In Kachasu v. A .G . [1967] Z R 145 at 163 it was stated that the expression does not mean 
"necessarily required” or even “urgently required” . In England the positive explanation was 
given as “a genuine, present need, something more than desire, although something less than 
absolute necessity.” See Gonsalcs v. Thompson [1921) C P C  477
[1968] Z R 99 at 12842.
offence under the law in force in Zambia of which he has been 
convicted.” 43
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This section is little more than a codification of the common law of 
homicide. The qualifications are really the common law defences to that 
crime. A person’s constitutional right to life is not infringed if he dies 
as the result of a lawful act of war or as a result of the use of reasonable 
force (a) in the defence of another person or property, (b) in order to effect 
a lawful arrest or prevent the escape of a person from lawful arrest or 
detention, (c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny, 
or (d) to prevent the commission by that person o f a criminal offence.44
PERSONAL LIBERTY45
“ No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as
may be authorised by law in any of the following cases . . .
(a) in the execution of a sentence or order of court or a 
lawful arrest;
(b) for preventing the spread of a contagious disease;
(c) for the care and treatment of persons reasonably 
suspected to be of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug 
addicts, or vagrants;
(d) for the sake of preventing unlawful entry into Zambia 
or for the purpose of a lawful removal of a person from 
Zambia;
(e) for the purpose of enforcing a lawful restriction or 
detention order.
These exceptions must be read in conjunction with the general powers of 
derogation in an emergency or under the security laws of the Republic.46 
They all add up to a formidable subtraction on the guarantee of personal 
liberty.
The procedural safeguards e.g., that a person arrested or detained 
must be given reasons for his arrest or detention, that he shall be brought 
before a court without undue delay, are standard in common law 
jurisdictions. They are discussed more fully below.
Special safeguards with regard to detention under emergency or other 
security measures are contained in Article 27 o f the constitution and may 
be enumerated in their sequence. When a person is detained he must be 
furnished within fourteen days with a written and detailed statement in
43‘ Aft 14 (1).
44 Aft 14 (2).
45' Art 15
46 See Article 30
a  language he understands and containing the grounds upon which he is 
detained. Within one month of his detention the particulars of the 
provision of the law under which he is held must be published in the 
gazette.
After one year from the date o f detention and thereafter within 
intervals of one year and if the detainee so requests, his case shall be 
reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law and 
presided over by a person appointed by the Chief Justice who is or is 
qualified to be a judge of the High Court. The person detained must be 
given reasonable facilities to consult a legal representative of his own choice 
at his own expense for the purpose of making representation to the tribunal 
or else he can appear in person. The reviewing tribunal may make 
recommendations on the necessity or expediency of continuing the 
detention to the authority, normally the President, that ordered the 
detention. The detaining authority is not obliged to act in accordance with 
the tribunal’s recommendations.
Any person in Zambia is in addition protected from illegal detention 
by the writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus will not be granted 
to a person serving a sentence imposed by a competent court. A person 
illegally detained may have a remedy in tort for assault or false 
imprisonment.47 *A person whose liberty may be threatened by an 
authority or inferior court may have recourse to the High Court for an 
injunction, or for the orders of prohibition or certiorari.
FREEDOM FROM  SLAVERY, FORCED LABOUR A N D  TORTURE
Article 16 of the constitutions prohibits the subjection of any person 
to slavery or to forced labour. The expression “ forced labour” does not 
include labour required by a sentence or order of court, labour reasonably 
required for the maintenance of a person under lawful detention, labour 
required by the duties of a member of the police or the armed forces, or 
labour that may be required during war of emergency. The last exception 
comes very close to removing the whole guarantee. “ Forced labour” does 
not include “ labour reasonably required as part of reasonably and normal 
communal or other civic obligations.”  What other forced labour imposed 
by an authority could not pass as communally or civicly required?
Article 17 protects the individual from torture, and inhuman and j 
degrading punishment or treatment unless it was authorised by law. (In t 
the then Sourthern Rhodesia the Appellate Division held that the. 
mandatory death sentence under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 
1960 s.33A was not “ inhuman and degrading”  and that those words related 
to  types or methods o f punishment, not to  its severety or 
appropriateness.4* In a later case the same court held that excessive delay
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in hanging a person sentenced to death for his part in a Zimbabwe African 
National Union campaign in which a Rhodesian Front chairman was killed 
was not inhuman treatment or punishment.)49
THE RIG H T TO OW N PROPERTY
No provision of the Constitution has caused so much controversy in 
Zambia as Article 18 which deals with the right to private property. It 
was the target of attack by all the political parties during the dispute over 
die ownerfhip of the mineral royalties immediately before independence. 
The goverrment threatened to repeal the article by referendum. It was 
finally amended in 1969 after a referendum in such a way as to allow 
government take-over of the land and the mines without having to pay 
excessive compensation.
The Article now states that no property shall be compulsorily taken 
by the State unless the taking or acquisition is necessary or expedient in 
the public interest subject to compensation determined by Parliament or 
subject to no compensation at all. Where compensation is granted the 
person entitled is permitted to remit out of Zambia the whole amount, 
or part of it after tax deductions subject to reasonable restrictions and 
regulations.50
The exceptions to the guarantee of property are numerous. Property 
may be compulsorily acquired without the protection of Article 18 (1) if 
the action is contained in a law providing
i. for the satisfaction of a tax, rate or due,
ii. a penalty imposed by law,
iii. in satisfaction of a debt under a lease, mortgage or contract,
iv. in execution of a judgement of a court,
v. where it is necessary to do so in the interest of the health of 
people, animals or plants.
vi. for so long only as may be necessary for the purpose of 
examination of inspection or improvement of the property.
These exceptions may be negatived in so far as any provision containing 
them may be shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
There is another group of exceptional conditions in which property 
may be compulsorily acquired without the protection of subsection (1). 
Unlike the exceptions enumerated above, these are not even qualified by 
the necessity to show that the provision containing them is reasonable. 
The property may be taken outright where it is
i. enemy property,
ii. the property of a deceased person or a person of unsound 
mind, or a minor, for the purpose of its administration for
49' DMamini & Others v. Carter <t Bosman 1968 (2) SA 445
50' Constitution (Amendment) Act, No. 5 o f  1969, Art 3, The original provision required prompt 
payment of adequate compensation which could be determined by a court in case o f a dispute.
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the benefit of the person beneficially entitled,
iii. the property of a declared bankrupt or a body corporate in 
liquidation for the benefit of creditors and other persons 
beneficially entitled,
iv. property subject to a trust for the purpose of vesting it in the 
trustees.
The apparently numerous exceptions exist for the most part in other 
countries as well. They do not empty the guarantee of its essence but mainly 
repeat the common law position. Like with other fundamental rights the 
right to provide compensation now remains only at the mercy of the 
Legislature, which can pass any law for the acquisition of property with 
or without compensation provided it is for a public interest.
The provision received judicial interpretation in Patel v. Attorney 
General.*' Patel was charged with two offences under the Exchange 
Control Act 51 2 and the regulations made under it (i) for doing an act 
preparatory to the making of payment outside Zambia and (ii) attempting 
to export currency. Customs officers had subjected Mr Patel’s postal 
correspondence to search and had seized some bank notes and papers in 
evidence. Patel challenged the action of the officers on three constitutional 
grounds which were referred to the High Court. Did the opening, 
examination and seizure of the postal articles constitute a contravention
(1) of the applicant’s right to privacy of property guaranteed by 
Article 19, or
(2) his freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 22, or
(3) his right to protection from deprivations of property as 
guaranteed by Article 18?
On the right to property guaranteed by Article 18, Mr Justice Magnus 
held that the applicant’s property had been compulsorily taken possession 
of but the exchange control came within the accepted derogation in s. 
18 (1) (a) (ii) i.e. it was expedient to secure the development of the nation’s 
financial resources for a purpose beneficial to the community. Furthermore 
the taking possession of the articles would still be saved by Article 18 (4) 
i.e. that it was temporary, “ for the purpose of any examination, 
investigation, trial or inquiry” . Finally, retention of property pending trial 
had not been and could not be shown to be unreasonable or unjustifiable 
in a democratic society..
The court rejected the argument that the regulations could be justified 
on the grounds that they were expedient in the interests of public security. 
It could conceivably happen that complete financial anarchy might so 
weaken the economy that internal disaffection might be caused leading 
to rioting and civil disturbance. So might widespread unemployment 
caused, say by over population. So might prolonged drought which 
disrupted agricultural production. . .  None of these would, however, have
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the quality o f  proximateness which would justify involving this 
exception.” 53
PROTECTION OF P R IV A C Y OF HOME A N D  OTHER PROPERTY
‘‘Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected 
to the search of his person or his property or the entry by 
others of his premises.” 54 5
What is guaranteed here is privacy not only of one’s home, but one’s 
premises which could include shops and factories, and other property in 
the absence of consent.
There are the usual exceptions in the public interest, for the protection 
of the rights of others, inspection by public authorities, or for the sake 
of enforcing a court order. The law under which .this derogation is made 
must be “ reasonably required” , not “ necessary or expedient” as in Article 
18. It must again be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
In Patel v. Attorney General5 it was held that the opening and 
examination of mail was prima facie a breach of the right guaranteed by 
Article 19 (1) but this was saved because it was reasonably required for 
the purpose of the scheme of exchange control justifiable under Article 
18. It was also held that the search and examination of mail without 
warrant was justifiable in a democratic society because mail was something 
in transit which required some degree of haste, and illicit dealings in 
currency were analogous to trafficking in contraband. But a law which 
gave officials carte blanche powers of search at their own discretion without 
a warrant would not be reasonable in a democratic society.56
RIG H T TO PROTECTION OF THE LA W
Article 20 contains procedural safeguards for persons accused of 
criminal offences.
“ If any person is charged with a criminal offence then, 
unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a 
fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial court established by law.” 57
Subsections 2 to 11 inclusive contain a list of presumptions and procedural 
safeguards already known to the common law e.g. the presumption of 
the accused’s innocence until conviction; the accused’s right to be informed 
with reasonable speed and in a language he understands, of the nature 
of the offence he is charged with; his right to be given adequate time and 
facilities to prepare his defence; his right to defend himself in court
At 32
54 Art 19
55 [1968] Z R 99
56' Ibid at 131 per Magnus J
57- Art 20 (1).
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personally “ or, at his own expense, by a legal representative of his own 
choice” ; the right to examine the prosecution’s witnesses; the right to an 
interpreter where necessary; the right to refuse to give evidence at his own 
trial; the right to be tried in a court held in public.
The qualifications to these guarantees are not many or unusual. Thus, 
in certain cases trials may be held in camera, legal representation may be 
removed before a subordinate court for an offence under African 
customary law, and a detained person tried for an offence committed 
against a law regulating the discipline of detainees may not be permitted 
legal representation of his choice or a right to cross examine the prosecution 
witnesses.
Only subsection (2) (d) dealing with the right of a person to be 
defended, “ at his own expense, by a legal representative of his own choice” 
has come up for decision before the courts. In Patel v. Attorney 
General,58 Mr Somabhai Bhullabhai Patel was charged with official 
corruption contrary to s. 348 (2) of the Penal Code and with the 
contravention of regulation 9 of the Exchange Control Regulations. He 
instructed his Zambian solicitor to brief Mr Thomas Kellock, a barrister 
resident in England but qualified to practise in Zambia. Mr Kellock came 
to Zambia but was informed that the Immigration Department refused 
him a work permit, hence he could not defend his client. Mr Patel 
challenged this refusal on the ground that it contravened his constitutional 
right to be represented by a legal representative of his own choice. The 
decision of the court turned on the meaning of the words “ legal 
representative” and on whether Mr. Kellock was in fact prevented from 
defending his client.
Skinner C J found on the evidence that Mr Kellock’s name was on 
the Roll of Practitioners and had a practising certificate and hence was 
entitled to appear before the courts.58 9 Also he was not under any legal 
disability to exercise his profession in Zambia. He held, following Nigerian 
and Indian cases, that a person is “ entitled to practise in Zambia” when 
he has a right of audience by virtue of registration and in addition is under 
no legal disability. On the second point he held that the relationship of 
client-solicitor, or barrister is not one of employer — employee. Mr. 
Kellock did not require a work permit. Hence he was not prevented from 
practising.
Consequently Mr Patel’s right to counsel of his choice was not 
infringed. The government was obviously determined that Mr Kellock be 
not allowed to defend Mr Patel. Mr Kellock was declared a prohibited 
immigrant before he could appear in court.
In Awolowo v. Federal Minister o f  Internal Affairs60 an English 
Q.C. was prevented from defending a Nigerian client because the minister
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refused him entry into the country. The court held that the defendant’s 
right to counsel of his choice was not violated for the section meant legal 
representative not Under a disability of any kind.
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
The Constitution in effect provides for a secular state in which 
religious freedom is guaranteed subject to the usual exceptions. Article 
21 Provides:
“ Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in 
the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and . . . 
freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and both in public and in 
private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
Except with his consent (or if he is a minor, the consent of 
his guardian) no person attending any place of education 
shall be required to receive religious instruction, or to take 
part in or attend religious ceremony or observance if that 
instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion other 
than this own.” 61
The section further provides that no religious community or denomination 
may be prevented from including religion in the education it provides. 
And no one may be compelled to take an oath contrary to his religious 
beliefs.
The- qualification to the guarantee of religious liberty is once again 
quite comprehensive. Any of the things forbidden under the first four 
subsections given above may be done if the state can show that it is 
reasonably required.
“ in the interests of defence, public safety, public morality or 
public order, public health; or
for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of 
other persons, including the right to observe and practise any 
religion without the unsolicited intervention of members of 
any other religion, unless the complainant can show that it is 
not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” .
As Blagden C J observed in the Kachasu case “ these provisions may sound 
a trifle involved but the meaning and intent of them are clear.” 62 They 
introduce the right to freedom of conscience, thought and religion subject 
to restraints imposed by a law satisfying certain conditions. The practical
“  An 21 (l)-(3)
62 (1967] Z R 145 at 161.
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effect of these provisions is to reproduce the common law position on 
religious liberty in England minus the established church. The English law 
was stated by a great authority in the following terms:
“ Save in so far as positive law may otherwise provide, the 
civil law (as opposed to ecclesiastical law) recognises and has 
always recognised the right of all to follow the dictates of 
their consciences in the religious opinions which they hold.” 63 645
In R  v de TagetM freedom of conscience was recognised, as part of the 
English law which was received as the law of Zambia. Legislative control 
of religioi s matters was underlined particularly in the case of politico- 
religious societies like the Watch-Tower Bible Tract Society.
In Kachasu v. Attorney-General65 the present provisions received 
close judicial interpretation. Faliya Kachasu was a school girl brought up 
as a Jehovah’s Witness. Her religion taught that it was sinful to sing hymns 
except to Jehovah. She and her father as believers regarded the singing 
of the National Anthem and saluting the National Flag as idolatory. They 
regarded these as religious ceremonies or observances contrary to their 
beliefs. Hence Feliya Kachasu declined to participate in these at school. 
She was suspended from attending classes in accordance with the provision 
of the Education (Primary and Secondary Schools) Regulations, 196666 
pending an undertaking by her to comply with the schoool directives. The 
regulation required pupils at Government or aided schools to sing the 
national anthem and salute the National Flag on certain occasions.
Miss Kachasu applied to the High Court for an order that her 
suspension was unlawful, that she should be readmitted to classes, and 
that she be excused on religious grounds from saluting the Flag and singing 
the Anthem on three grounds:
(a) that the suspension constituted an interference with her 
freedom of conscience, thought and religion as provided in 
Chapter III of the Constitution;
(b) that the regulations are invalid, null and void because they 
were ultra vires s. 12 of the principal act and were in conflict 
with Article 21 of the Constitution;
(c) that “ for the purposes of Article 21 of the Constitution the 
test as to what constitutes a religious ceremony observance or 
instruction is subjective and not objective.”
Thus the court had to decide whether Article 28 of the Constitution also 
gave it jurisdiction to entertain issues other than constitutional issues, 
whether Regulations 25 and 31 were intra vires the Education Act 1966 
and whether Articles 13 and 21 of the Constitution were contravened. It 
was held that:-
63' Halsbury: Laws o f  England Vol. XI para. 711; see also Hawkes i Moxev [1917] 80 L J (K B) 504; Flint v 
Courthrope (1918) 87 L J (K B> 501
64■ [1935| L R of N R 13
65 [1967) Z R 145
66- Regulation 25
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1. Although Article 28 of the Constitution confers a special 
jurisdiction from which the court must not stray, collateral 
issues connected with a constitutional issue such as in this 
case may be determined together.
2. Regulations 25 and 31 were infra vires the Educational Act 
1966.
3. Where a religious opinion is in question a subjective test is 
applied. But whether a particular ceremony or observance is 
religious or not must be determined objectively.
Accordingly notwithstanding the views of the applicant, the singing of 
the Anthem and saluting of the flag were, objectively, not religious 
ceremonies or observances.
The suspension of Miss Kachasu was a hindrance to her fundamental 
right to free conscience, thought and religion under Article 21 (II) (2) of 
the Constitution. She was in effect being coerced into singing the National 
Anthem against her religious beliefs. However, this hindrance was 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society; and reasonably required 
in the interests of national defence and for the purpose of protecting the 
rights and freedoms of other persons.
The Kachasu case is important not only because of the issues it decided 
but also because it reveals perhaps more than any other case the methods 
and approach of the courts in interpreting Chapter III. In the instant case 
the decision that the derogation from the guarantee of freedom of 
conscience was saved by the exigencies of public security was reached by 
a tortuous route. Counsel for the applicant had submitted that he could 
not see how exempting a few little children from saluting the flag and 
singing the National Anthem could possibly imperil the state or other 
people. The Chief Justice admitted that this was a powerful argument with 
which he was in sympathy. But he finally accepted the Attorney-General’s 
arguments that the ceremonies were intended to foster national unity which 
“ is the basis of national security”  on which the very freedoms of Chapter 
III depend.
“ National Security is thus paramount not only in the 
interests of the state but also in the interests of each 
individual member of the State, and measures designed to 
achieve and maintain that security must come first; and 
subject to the provisions of the constitution, must override, if 
need be, the interests of individuals and of minorities with 
which they conflict.” 67
The fact is that it is very difficult for an individual ever to challenge 
successfully any measure which the authorities claim is in favour of public 
security.
67. [1967) Z R 145 at 164
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Secondly, the court gave full force to the presumption “ominia 
presumuntur rite esse acta” with regard to statutes and ministerial acts.68 
This leaves a heavy burden on the applicant to prove the contrary.69 He 
has to show that he has been “ hindered” in the exercise of his religious 
fights; further, he must show that this hindrance is not saved under the 
section.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
“ Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in 
the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, 
freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to 
receive ideas and information without interference (whether 
the communication be to the public generally or to any 
person or class of persons) and freedom of interference with 
his correspondence.” 70 712*
The permitted derogation must be reasonably required in the public 
interest, for the purpose of protecting other people’s reputations, and other 
rights or restrictions imposed on public officers. The exceptions are 
fortified by the law of defamation and libel, obscene publications and 
sedition. In Chitambala and Others v R1' the appellants unsuccessfully 
appealed against conviction for conspiracy to publish a document with 
a seditious intention. A seditious intention was defined as an intention 
to excite the inhabitants of the territory “ to attempt to procure the 
alteration otherwise than by lawful means of any matter in the territory 
as by law established.” In Patel v Attorney-General2the court held that 
the opening, examination or seizure of postal articles containing currency 
note and wrappers marked with pencilled crosses were not correspondence. 
If they were, Article 22 would have been violated and the opening of the 
packets unlawful.
In the Nigerian case DPP  v ObP  a law under which a man was 
convicted of sedition for publishing the words “ Down with the enemies 
of the people, exploiters of the weak and oppressors of the poor” was 
held to be consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression on the basis that it was reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society to take reasonable precautions by prohibiting acts which if 
unchecked might indirectly lead to public disorder. This decision, if 
followed in Zambia, would narrow guarantee to a degree that was probably 
not originally in tented.
68, Ibid at 162 See also Arzika v Governor, Northern Region [1961] A N l  R 379 per Bate J at 
382.
69' Cheranci v Cheranci [1961] A N L R 24
70- Art. 22 (1)
71- [1961] S J N R 9
72’ [1968] Z R 99 at 132
73, [1961]. All N L R 186 cf. the Southern Rhodesia case Mukahiera v R. 1961 R & N  872 where 
an accused was convicted for telling a meeting not to worry the police because they were
“ small boys” . See also Haddon v R A D 106/65.
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“ Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in 
the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, 
that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate w ith ' 
other persons and in particular to form or belong to trade 
unions or other associations for the protection of his 
interests,” 74
The freedom guaranteed may be abrogated by law reasonably required 
in the interest of public security, health or morality, or the rights and 
freedoms of others or a law that imposes restrictions on public officers 
or that regulates the trade unions. Any of the exceptions must be 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
Article 23 has not yet received judicial consideration under the 
Independence Constitution. Organisations have been banned or their 
activities restricted under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance. 
There are also restrictions under the Penal Code on matters relating to 
criminal conspiracy, unlawful assemblies, riots e tc . Restrictive or 
regulatory laws are also common e .g . the iaws regulating the formation 
registration and operation of companies, trade unions and co-operatives.
All this has been done within the ambit of the exceptions to the 
guarantee but does not render the article nugatory.
The President, for example, is able to ban any organisation in Zambia 
temporarily or permanently but he could not prohibit the formation o f 
another organisation. Thus, the introduction of a one-party system in 1973 
required the prior amendment of Article 23. In N k u m b u la  v A tto r n e y -  
G enerar- the High Court considered whether the proposed introduction 
of a one party state contravened the freedom o f association which is 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that the proposal was not 
unconstitutional provided that its effectuation was preceded by an 
appropriate constitutional amendment.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
Article 24 Provides:
“ No person shall be deprived of his freedom of movement 
and for purpose o f this article the said freedom means the 
right to move freely throughout Zambia, the right to reside 
in any part of Zambia, the right to enter Zambia and 
immunity from expulsion from Zam bia.”
The object of this guarantee is to remove all restraints on the movement 
of citizens of Zambia within the Republic. Herein lies the distinction of
74' A n. 23 (11
, 75' 11972] Z R HI
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this section from Article 15 which guarantees personal liberty. A person 
whose freedom is restricted under either article may have his case reviewed 
by a tribunal.76 The chairman of the tribunal must be a person who is or 
is qualified to be a judge of the High Court.
Like other freedoms, the freedom of movement in Zambia is also 
qualified. Thus the article does not protect a person from lawful detention 
or from a law imposing a reasonably required restriction in the public 
interest (defence, safety, order, morality or public health), a law restricting 
the movement of public officers, or the removal from Zambia of non­
citizens.77 Thus the President issued special regulations restricting the 
movement of foreign diplomats to a radius of twenty miles from Lusaka 
without infringing the article78. In two cases involving British subjects of 
long residence in Zambia, it was held that they had “ no right under the 
constitution to liberty of movement” 79 but only, under the Immigration 
Act 1954, a non-prohibited immigrant status.
P R O T E C T I O N  F R O M  D IS C R IM IN A  T IO N
“ No law shall make any provision that is discriminatory 
either of itself or in its effect.
No person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any 
person acting by virtue of any written law or in the 
performance of the functions of any public office or any 
public authority” .80
The expression “ discriminatory” is defined as affording different 
treatment to persons attributable wholly or mainly to their differences in 
race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour or creed* whereby 
the person complaining has suffered a disability or restriction not 
applicable to others of a different category.
The guarantee is followed by a list of important exceptions. In the 
first place the section only applies to citizens of Zambia, not to all persons 
in Zambia. It does not apply to laws for the appropriation of the general 
revenues of the Republic, or to laws pertaining to matters of personal law 
e.g. adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, or to the applications of African 
customary law to particular tribes or to any other special treatment which 
is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.81 Secondly, 
discriminatory legislation is permissible if it makes reasonable provisions 
laying down the qualifications for public or local government officers.82 
Thirdly, the article does not protect anybody from discrimination by laws 
which were in force on October 24 1964, or to any amendments of such 
laws.83 The area of legalised discrimination is thus quite wide.
76 Art 24 and Art 27 (1) (d)
77 Art 24 (2); Chipango v A-G  [1970] S J Z 179; Radebe v The People [1972j Z  R  +.
78 Southern Africa, 26 March 1965
79 A G v. Thixton [1967] S J Z 1; Pawn v A G  [1969] S J Z 10 at 27.
80 Art. 25 (1) (2)
81 Art. 2$ (4)
82 Art. 25 (9)
83' Art 25 (4) (d) read together with the constitutions of Zambia Act (1973) s 6.
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However, in the present political situation in Zambia it is not likely 
that there can be much discriminatory legislation or practice on racial 
grounds in view of the official policy of the government. Since 
pre-independence discriminatory legislation was mainly against Africans 
who are now controlling the government, it can always be redressed by 
repealing the offending provisions. The section could become important 
if more people invoked it with respect to discriminations on political or 
tribal grounds.
That the protection from discrimination is not rendered wholly otiose 
by the exceptions was demonstrated in Chilufya v. The City Council o f  
KitweS*  Mr Adam Chilufya, a member and former Parliamentary 
candidate of the African National Congress was prohibited by a resolution 
of the Kitwe City Council from carrying on trading business which he had 
done peacefully and successfully for twenty three years in Kitwe markets. 
Since the election campaign of 1966 his stall had on various occasions been 
picketted, boycotted and damaged by UNIP supporters. The reasons for 
the City Council’s action given in the mayor’s affidavit was that Mr. 
Chilufya “ was so unpopular in the market that his presence therein 
constituted a security risk in relation to the efficient administration of the 
m arket. . . such as to endanger the property of the defendant and also 
his own person.” Chilufya challenged the resolution on the grounds that 
it was ultra vires and unconstitutional.
Justice Mallon held the resolution of the City Council terminating 
Chilufya’s trading licence was ultra vires on two grounds:
(a) It was unreasonable, unfair and contrary to the principles of 
natural justice.
(b) It was a breach of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights under 
Articles 13 and 25 of the Constitution of Zambia. The City 
Council “ treated him in a discriminatory manner because of 
his political opinions, in the performances of their functions 
as public authority.” 85
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The structure and general function of the courts as an institution of 
control on presidential governments have already been discussed. However, 
the courts also possess a specific regulatory role in respect of the 
fundamental rights of the individual.
In the first place, the Constitution makes provision for the review 
; of a bill or statutory instrument which if enforced, would be inconsistent 
s with the Bill of Rights.86 Whenever such a complaint is made the Chief 
Justice appoints a tribunal of two persons who are or have been judges 
of the High Court to make a report on it. The request must be made by
; M {1967] Z R 115
I*5' Ibid at 78. Set also {19671 Z R 115 at 128.*  Ait 28
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not less than twenty-one members of the National Assembly by notice in 
writing. In the case of a Bill, the notice must reach the Speaker within 
three days after its final reading, in the case of a statutory instrument it 
must reach the authority making the instrument (usually the President) 
within fourteen days of its publication.*7 If the tribunal reports to the 
President and to the Speaker, that the Bill of statutory instrument would 
contravene any of me fundamental rights provisions, the President may 
withhold his assent from the bill87 8 or annul the statutory instrument by 
order.89 90This potentially powerful instrument of review is weakened by 
the last provision that it is open to the President to ignore the 
recommendations of the tribunal. In any case, certain bills are excluded 
from the review process altogether viz. a Bill for the appropriation of the 
general revenues or a Bill expressly amending the Constitution.
Secondly, there is provision for the Chief Justice to appoint a similar 
tribunal to determine claims for legal aid made by persons intending to 
apply to the High Court in respect of contravention of the Bill of Rights.
11 the tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has reasonable grounds for 
bringing the petition and that he is unable to meet the legal costs on his 
own account or that the issues raised are of general public importance, 
it may grant him a legal aid certificate so that his costs will be paid from 
the general revenue.*®
Thirdly, the actual machinery for the enforcement of the Bill of Rights 
is provided in Article 29 of the Constitution. A person who wants redress 
from the High Court in respect of the Bill must allege that any of its 
sections "h a s  been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to 
him” .91 The High Court will then have power to hear and determine the 
issues raised as well as any collateral questions92 and may make such 
orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it considers appropriate 
for the enforcement of the Bill of Rights. If a question of the contravention 
of the Bill arises in a subordinate court the magistrate presiding may refer 
the question to the High Court. The reference is obligatory if a party to 
the proceedings requests it.93 Both sides to the proceedings may appeal 
against a decision of the High Court in a Chapter III case unless it was 
dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.94
The powers of review in Article 29 are in themselves an effective 
instrument to control legislature and executive action. They cannot be 
invoked against a Bill that has not yet become law or against actions of 
individuals.95 Parliament may confer upon the High Court and the
87 Art 28 (2) (a) & (b)
**• Art 79(3)
89 Art 81 (3)
90 Art 28 (4) (5)
9I- Art 29(1)
92 Art 29 (2)
93 Art 29 (3) Patel v AG  [1968] Z  R  99
94 A rt 29 (4)
95' Nkum bula v Attorney-General [1972] Z R 111
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Supreme Court more powers for enforcing the Bill of Rights.96
The record of the courts in enforcing the Bill of Rights has been on 
the whole timorous. After the T h ix to n  and P a to n  cases the courts have 
sought to do justice to the individual but shied away from clearly defining 
the limits of executive action.
Thus in P a te l  v A tto r n e y -G e n e r a l the court held that the petitioner's 
right to a legal representative of his choice was not infringed by a 
ministerial intention accompanied by an ineffective order designed to 
prevent Mr Kellock from defending his client. Within a week of the 
decision, Mr. Kellock was deported by an effective ministerial order.
In the K a ch a su  case the court came closer to abdicating jurisdiction 
to the executive and legislature. It defined the qualification of national 
security so widely and raised its paramountcy so high as to render any 
challenge to an executive claim of public security extremely arduous. The 
standard of public security in K a ch a su  was indirectly criticised but was 
not abandoned in a subsequent case. Its equation of “ democratic society” 
with the existing Zambian system was also an interpretation favourable 
to executive liberty. Finally, Chief Justice Blagden stated that in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, the courts “ must give due weight to the 
opinion of the Legislature as expressed in a statute.”  He applied the 
presumption that the Legislature or a Minister acts constitutionally.97 He 
further adopted the statement of Holines J. that “ the legislature are 
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as 
great a degree as the courts.” 98
The tendency therefore has been to adopt strict construction of the 
guarantees but a liberal construction of the derogations. The dictum of 
Blagden C.J. in A .G .  v T h irx to n 99 that “ when fundamental rights of 
liberty are concerned, the courts should be slow to place an interpretation 
on the relevant provisions which would have the effect of denying these 
rights to the subject” has not guided the courts consistently in subsequent 
decisions.
The power of judicial review is of course wider than the Bill of Rights. 
It is the function of the courts to adjudicate on the validity of laws and 
executive actions with regard to the whole Constitution or enabling 
legislation.
The High Court also has reviewing powers with regard to inferior courts 
and administrative tribunals. They have power to grant the judicial 
remedies such as the orders of ce r tio ra r i, q u o  w a rra n to , prohibition, 
m an dam u s  and injunctions. The application of this power of review was 
demonstrated in the pre-independence case of T he Q u een  v A tto r n e y -
Art 29 (6)
” ■ At 14.
,8' Missouri Kansas <t Texas Railroad v May 194 U S 267 
"•  [1967] ,S J Z 1 •
G en era l, E x  P a r te  A l le n .m  Kenneth Allen was a senior superentendent 
of prisions in charge at Bwana Mkumbwa during the Federation. The 
Federal Director of Prisons suspended him from duty on account of certain 
charges concerning some irregularities at the prison. A tribunal of three 
prison officers conducted the trial of the alleged offences for three days 
with legal representatives for both sides and witnesses. After twenty days 
the tribunal found Allen guilty on four counts and dismissed him from 
service. The verdict was confirmed by the Director of Prisons and by the 
Minister of Law and Order. Allen applied from an order of c e r tio ra r i  
originally directed against the Federal Minister of Law and Order but later 
(because of the dissolution of the Federation) against the Attorney General 
for Northern Rhodesia “ to bring in and quash the record of the 
proceedings” of the tribunal.
The High Court found firstly, that the tribunal of three men was 
without statutory authority, being improperly constituted. The Prisons 
Act, 1955, ss. 46 and 47 only authorised the appointment of one man to 
investigate irregularities. Consquently the court held that the tribunal “ had 
no jurisdiction to enter upon this enquiry at all.” 10 01
Secondly, the court decided in favour of its jurisdiction to entertain 
an application for ce r tio ra r i against any tribunal which conducts a trial 
in the territory, or, where it no longer has custody of the record, against 
the authority having the d e  ju r e  and d e  f a c to  custody.
Thirdly, although certio rari, will not lie in respect of a tribunal which 
acted not merely in excess of jurisdiction but without any colour of legal 
authority,102 it will lie where, as in this case, a court is only improperly 
constituted103 with consequent lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, it was held that the tribunal was not merely administrative 
with no duty to act judicially, but was under such a duty, since it purported 
to act under statutory provisions of a judicial nature. The court relied 
on a passage from Professor de Smith that an authority is likely to be 
held to act in a judicial capacity if it is designated as a tribunal or if its 
general characteristics or “ trappings” closely resemble those of courts even 
when it is exercising functions of a wide discretionary nature.” 104
132 Mubako, Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review
100' [1964] S J N R 41
101 At p. 45
,Q2' de Smith: Judicial Review o f  Administrative Action (196S) 392. See also Halsbury (3rd Edit.) 
para. 266 p 144
103- Halsbury op.cit para 269 p 142; R. (Meehan) v. Hardy [1917] 2 1 R 283.
I04’ Judicial Review o f  Administrative Action (1959 Edn) 289.
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